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The European Banking Authority (EBA) stress tests, which aim to quantify banks’ capital shortfall 
in a potential future crisis (adverse economic scenario), further stimulated an academic debate over 
systemic risk measures and their predictive/informative content. Focusing on marked based 
measures, Acharya et al. (2010) provides a theoretical background to justify the use of  Marginal 
Expected Shortfall (MES) for predicting the stress test results, and verify it on the first stress test 
conducted after the 2007-2008 crises on the US banking system (SCAP, Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program). The aim of this paper is to further test the goodness of MES as a predictive 
measure, by analysing it in relation to the results of the 2014 European stress tests exercise 
conducted by EBA. Our results are strongly dependent on index used to capture the systemic 
distress event, whereby MES, based on a global market index, does not show association with EBA 
stress test, by contrast to F-MES, which is based on a financial market index, and has a significant 
information and predictive power. Our results may carry useful regulatory implication for the stress 
test exercises. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis highlighted the importance of interconnections in the financial system 
and the need to measure the impact of contagion. Following the crisis a rich literature has been 
growing on the very same problem of defining systemic risk and the issues connected to its 
measurement. Despite these efforts, there is still no consensus either on a unique definition of 
systemic risk, or a single risk measure.  While different definitions can be found in the literature 
stressing different aspects
2
, generally speaking systemic risk involves the whole financial system 
instead of the single institution and it spreads over the real economy.  In line with this multiplicity 
of definitions, a wide range of measures have been developed for systemic risk.  
 
Systemic risk by its nature involves both a cross-sectional and a time dimension
3
, and available 
measures captures these two dimensions in different ways. Given the huge variety of measures, a 
classification of them is a difficult task. Recent surveys and classifications can be found in Bisias et 
al. (2012) and in De Bandt et al. (2013). Far from being exhaustive, we just sketch a rough picture 
of the most common measures. Firstly we can differentiate between measures based on the single 
bank, which mainly modify traditional risk measures to include contagion effects, and measures 
based on the system as a whole. As for the first group, measures can be based on market data 
(mainly equity returns or CDS spread) or on balance-sheet and regulatory data. The second group 
instead includes on one hand measures of connectivity based on networks (graph theory) which 
focus on the cross-sectional dimension of risk only; on the other hand early warnings indicators 
which captures the time dimension. 
 
The crisis has shown the importance of controlling for systemic risk in order to preserve financial 
and macroeconomic stability and in the end to guarantee economic growth and welfare. Therefore, 
regulatory authorities have worked in order to improve the architecture of financial supervision. 
Focusing on Europe, among the new authorities the European Banking Authority (EBA) has a 
particularly important role in preserving the solvability of the banking system. Starting from 2011 
EBA have been conducting stress test exercises on the European banking system, testing its 
resilience to adverse macroeconomic scenarios in terms of single banks’ capital over risky assets 
ratio. The stress test over a single bank is based on the bank’s balance sheet and on a scenario 
generated by stressing several financial  and economic variables. 
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 See e.g. Eijfinger (2009) and Borio and Drehman (2009) for a discussion and Smaga (2014) for a recent survey. 
3
 These two dimensions have been discussed as for credit risk since the debate over procyclicality of Basel II developed: 
see e.g. Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005).  
 
A literature on systemic risk measures and their connection with regulatory stress of the banking 
system has been developing in the latter few years. For example Acharya et al. (2012) proposed a 
capital shortfall estimation approach that can be used for the US stress tests required under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  Based on the 2011 U.S. and European stress tests, Acharya et al. (2014)  compare 
capital shortfalls measured by the regulator to those of a methodology based on market data, and 
show that the difference can be imputed to the fact that risk measures used in risk-weighted assets 
(i.e. in regulatory stress tests) are cross-sectionally uncorrelated with market measures of risk . 
 
Against this backdrop, in this paper we analyse the relation between systemic risk measures based 
on market data and stress test, and we propose and empirical assessment based on the October 2014 
EBA stress test of the European banking system. In particular, in Section 2 we review the main 
bank-level measures of systemic risk based on market data, focusing on the Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (MES) proposed by Acharya et al (2010). In Section 3 we illustrate the dataset, we present 
our analyses and we discuss the results. Last Section concludes.  
 
 
2. Systemic risk measures based on stock market data 
The literature on systemic risk has been growing very fast in the last decade and, as stressed in the 
Introduction, a great variety of measures for systemic risk are now available. Focusing on bank-
level measures based on stock market data, the most common metrics for systemic risk are CoVaR 
introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) proposed 
by Acharya et al. (2010). These measures stem from an extension of traditional risk measures, 
namely Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES), which accounts for contagion effects 
between the single bank and the whole financial system. 
 
Let 𝑅𝑖 and 𝑅𝑗 be the portfolio returns
4
 of two generic institution and q the confidence level, 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑖





𝑖 ) = 𝑞        (1) 
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 VaR and ES are defined here in percentage terms (returns) instead of levels of profit and loss . 
Hence 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
 represents the q quantile of the bank i’s  return distribution conditional on the 
event that bank j’s return are at the q VaR level. By considering the difference between this measure 
and the same conditional on the event that bank j’s return are at the median level quantifies the 
contribution of bank i to the risk of bank j. This measure can serve different purposes by changing 
the interpretation of i and j: if j is interpreted as the whole banking system, then 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
 
quantifies the contribution of bank i to the risk of the financial system. On the other hand, if i is 
interpreted as the banking system, then 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
  quantifies the fragility of bank i in case of a 
financial crisis. 
 
In order to introduce MES, recall that while VaR represents the maximum loss at a certain 
confidence level, ES represents average returns in case of exceeding the VaR limit. To define MES, 
the returns of the whole system are considered: the 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑞
𝑗
 is defined as the average returns of bank j 




= 𝐸(𝑅𝑗|𝑅𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖 )                                                                                                               (2) 
 
This measure is close to the second interpretation of  CoVaR, i.e. it quantifies the fragility of bank i 
in case of a crisis. Therefore these two measures are similar in spirit, particularly if compared to 
other measures of systemic risk. The comparison of VaR and ES can be extended to CoVaR and 
MES. 
 
As for the estimation, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) suggest to estimate CoVaR by quantile 









𝑘=1                                                                                                                        (3) 
 
where  the nq observations are selected as the q worst realizations of the system returns. 
 
In Section 3, following the lines of Acharya et al. (2010), we focus on MES, which lends itself to be 
confronted with regulatory stress test exercises, since it captures the fragility of a single bank in the 
presence of a crisis.  
 
 
3. Empirical analysis: MES and stress test 
The EBA stress test exercise aims at quantifying the banks’ capital shortfall in a potential future 
crisis defined by an adverse economic scenario. Acharya et al. (2010) provides a theoretical 
background to justify the use of MES for predicting the results of a stress test. The authors propose 
an economic model where the regulator maximises a welfare function capturing the bank owners’ 
utility, the cost of debt insurance and the externality of a financial crisis. The optimal policy 
emerging from the model consists of a tax also related to the bank’s contribution to overall systemic 
risk, which is quantified by the bank’s loss during a crisis (the authors call it Systemic Expected 
Shortfall, henceforth  SES). Acharya et. al (2010) formally draw the relation between SES and each 
bank’s MES, i.e. its contribution to the risk (expected shortfall) of the entire system. The model 
proposed by Acharya et al. (2010) also includes ex-ante leverage as the other component 
determining SES.  
 
Based on these arguments we analyse the informative content of MES in relation to the results of 
the 2014 European stress tests exercise. Our empirical analysis is in line with the analysis 
performed in Acharya et al. (2010) for US data; we also performed a robustness check over the 
index used to capture the benchmark portfolio, whereby beside a global market index (used for 
MES) we consider a financial market index (which defines what we address as F-MES). 
 
3.1. The data 
In building our sample we start from the 130 European banks considered in the last EBA’s  stress 
test exercise. The stress tests consider the balance-sheet data at the end of 2013 and apply adverse 
economic scenarios for the period 2014-2016 based on a large number of financial and 
macroeconomic variables
5
. In particular, banks are evaluated in relation to their Common Equity 
Tier 1 both on a baseline and on an adverse scenario: the capital ratio should remain over 8% in the 
baseline scenario and should not go below 5.5%  in the adverse one. From the results published by 
EBA we infer the following variables to be used in this work:  
 
 Deficit is the possible capital shortfall in the adverse scenario, which is zero if capital is 
above the required level;  
 Total loss is the cumulative loss on both banking and trading book at the end of 2016 in the 
adverse scenario.   
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 See www.eba.europa.eu for details on scenarios. 
In order to investigate the relation between the results of the stress tests and the MES as a market 
data based measure of systemic risk, we need to restrict our sample to the banks quoted on the 
market. In particular, we want to evaluate the informative content of MES as for its predictive 
power for the stress test results: therefore we measure MES using daily equity returns over 2013 
and use it as ‘predictor’ over the stress period 2014-2016. By filtering for the availability of equity 
returns over 2013, we restrict our sample to 53 of the 130 banks. Then we further exclude from the 
sample 9 banks for which there were not regular exchanges
6
 during 2013. As a result we have a 
sample of 44 banks. Appendix A reports the list of banks in our sample, as well as information 
about  country, capital shortfall, common equity and total loss. 
 
We estimate MES at 5%, that is we take the 5% worst days for the market returns over 2013 and 
then compute the average equity returns for these days on every bank in the sample.  As for the 
benchmark market portfolio to calculate MES, we consider two alternatives:  
 the MSCI Europe as a global economic index thus obtaining standard MES 
 the MSCI Europe Banks as an index of the financial sector thus obtaining what is named F-
MES.  
 
3.2. The regression analyses for MES and F-MES  
The main question we want to answer in this work is: does MES or F-MES predict the results from 
the stress tests? To do this end we use regression analyses and we evaluate the informative content 
of these measures with respect to two outcomes from the stress tests: the capital shortfall and the 
total loss. The definition of the variables used in the regression analysis is reported in Appendix B. 
 
As for the capital shortfall, in order to distinguish between banks with zero shortfall (passing the 
test) and banks with positive shortfall, we create a binary variable (DEF) taking value 1 when there 
is a capital shortfall. As for total loss, in order to avoid a size effect in the presence of a quite 
diversified banks’ sample, we consider both the ratio of total loss over total assets (LOSS_RATE) 
and the ratio of total loss over capital (LOSS_CAP). Total assets and capital are observed at the end 
of 2013 (starting point for our analysis).  
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables (both observed and estimated) 
and  contains also the variable ES (expected shortfall estimated for the single banks), which will be 
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 We excluded banks for which daily returns are zero for more than 25% of the dates considered, which resulted in 
excluding from the sample the following banks: Alpha Bank, Bank of Cyprus, Bank of Valletta, Dexia NV, Hellenic 
Bank, Lloyd Banking Group plc, Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor, OsterreichischeVolksbanken AG, Permanent tsb. 
used later in the analysis, and the variable LEVERAGE (Total assets over book value of equity at 
31/12/2013), which is included in the analysis for comparison with Acharya et al. (2010). It can be 
observed that, as expected, for all the possible variables, the mean conditional on the presence of 
capital shortfall is higher than the unconditional mean. 
 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics 
 
 DEF LOSS_RATE LOSS_CAP MES F_MES ES LEVERAGE 
        
 Mean  0.227273  0.033907  0.695590  2.380455  3.090000 5.853662  16.64065 
 Median  0.000000  0.032054  0.537085  2.400000  3.105000 4.698641  16.66362 
 Maximum  1.000000  0.102567  2.321826  5.040000  5.980000 29.13606  36.27221 
 Minimum  0.000000  0.007184  0.052578  0.580000  0.250000 2.350680  1.893708 
 Std. Dev.  0.423915  0.020221  0.479518  0.792899  1.387529 4.623816  8.642391 
Mean given 
DEF  0.054094 1.329262 2.72 4.44 
10.3374 
20.3635 
Data sources: Datasteram and EBA.  
Note: 44 observations,“Mean given DEF” is mean conditional on the presence of capital shortfall (DEF=1). 
 
 
We first consider the binary variable DEF as dependent variable and run a logit regression.
7
 Table 2 
reports results for the case where each risk measure is considered alone (MES, F-MES, and 
Leverage in column (1), (2), and (3) respectively) and for the case where MES and F-MES are 
evaluated jointly with Leverage.  
 
Table 2  The informative content of MES over Capital shortfall: logit regression 
 
Dependent variable: DEF 













  0.6379 
(0.4533) 
 
F_MES  1.3365*** 
(0.3569) 
  1.4577*** 
(0.4275) 






Mean dep. Var. 0.2273 0.2273 0.2273 0.2273 0.2273 
McFadden R-
squared 
0.0518 0.3146 0.0537 0.0885 0.3499 
Notes: 44 Observations; Huber-White standard errors; z-statistics in parenthesis; *,**,*** stand for 10%, 5%, 1% 
significance respectively 
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 For a robustness check we also performed a probit regression obtaining the same results. 
As highlighted in Table 2, all risk measures have the correct sign: a higher value increases the 
probability of having a capital shortfall. Nonetheless, F_MES is much more significant and 
produces quite a high R-squared value than MES and Leverage. Moreover, when considered jointly, 
only F-MES keeps a high positive correlation with capital shortfall.  
 
Then we turn to the dimension of losses, and we report results in Table 3 and 4 for the Loss rate and 
the Loss over capital respectively. Since the introduction of Leverage in the previous regression 
does not substantially change the picture, here we focus on the informative content of MES and F-
MES.
8
 As for the Loss rate, the F-MES is again highly significant with the a positive sign as 
expected, while MES is not significant and even has the wrong sign.  
 
Table 3 The informative content of MES over Loss rate: OLS regression 
 
Dependent variable: LOSS_RATE 








F_MES  0.0052 
(0.00197)** 
Leverage   
R-squared 0.0011 0.1273 
Adj. R-squared -0.0227 0.1066 




Table 4 The informative content of MES over Loss over capital: OLS regression 
 
Dependent variable: LOSS_CAP 








F_MES  0.1576*** 
(0.0436) 
Leverage   
R-squared 0.0077 0.208 
Adj. R-squared -0.0159 0.1891 
Notes:  44 Observations; White standard errors; t-statistics in parenthesis; *,**,*** stand for 10%, 5%, 1% significance 
respectively 
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 Further we believe that using Leverage as an explanatory variable is not appropriate when the dependent is the loss 
rate given it is defined over total asset.  
As for the Loss over capital, the F-MES is again highly significant with positive sign while MES is 
not significant although but with the expected sign.  
 
In sum, our results are not in favour of the use of MES as predictor for stress test results, but only of 
F-MES: in fact, when the same measure is calculated with reference to the financial sector instead 
of the whole economic system it is much more informative. This result differ from Acharya et al. 
(2010), where MES emerges to be informative with respect to the outcome of the stress test, and 
there are no differences in the results when switching from the generic stock index to the financial 
one. It has to be highlighted that the analysis presented in Acharya et al. (2010) refers to the US 
stress test of Spring 2009: the returns used for MES calculation cover roughly the previous year, 
which corresponds to the beginning of the crisis. In our analysis the period considered is less 
turbulent, and this could explain the different results. As a robustness check we tried to calculate 
MES over the same period considered by Acharya et al (2010), but we do not find improvements in 
the informative contents of MES.  
 
As a further robustness check, we also tried to calculate MES by using Eurostoxx50 as the reference 
index. In this case the results are slightly better: in the logit estimation the coefficient is 5% 
significant and the Mc-Fadden 2R  increases to about 12%  but the improvement in terms of 
forecasting is negligible. 
 
3.3 MES and F-MES vs ES 
In order to understand the informative content of MES and F-MES, we also tried the more 
traditional risk measure of  expected shortfall (ES) as predictor. From results reported in Table 5, 
ES appears to work well in predicting the stress test results, being positively related to the three 
outcomes, always significant and highly so when it comes to the loss rate and the loss over capital. 
 
Table 5 The informative content of Expected shortfall  
 
 Dep. Var. DEF 
Logit regression 
 Dep. Var. LOSS_RATE 
OLS regression 

















Mc-Fadden 2R  0.283899 2R  0.239294 0.263041 
  Adj 2R  0.221182 0.245494 




Focusing on the prediction of capital shortfall (logit regression), in Figure 1 we show the estimated 
probability of capital shortfall versus the actual shortfall from stress tests. The capital shortfall is 
predicted by a high probability in the F-MES regression; the probability of  capital shortfall is quite 
flat in the MES regression, which is clearly overperformed by the simple ES regression. 
 
 




Table 6 presents the percentage of correct predictions with different cut-off value. The first  and the 
second columns present the percentage of correct versus incorrect predictions over the cases of no 
shortfall and shortfall respectively; the last column presents the correct versus incorrect overall 
predictions. It emerges that, by fixing the cut-off at the standard 0.5 level,  F_MES produces the 
highest percentage of correct overall predictions. Since MES delivers flat and low probability of 
capital shortfall, it correctly predicts all the positive no shortfall cases, but it performs very poorly 
in predicting the shortfall cases. We also fix the cut-off at 0.23 (about the actual percentage of 
shortfall in the sample): even if in this case ES produces the highest percentage of total correct 
prediction, F-MES can capture 80% of the shortfall: if we are interested in a conservative output F-
MES still performs better.  
  
 
Table 6 Percent of correct prediction from logit estimates for the three measure, by cut-off 
value 
 
Cut-off 0.5 DEF=0 DEF=1 TOTAL 
 MES as explanatory variable 
% Correct 100 10 79.55 
% Incorrect 0 90 20.45 
 F-MES as explanatory variable 
% Correct 94.12 50.00 84.09 
% Incorrect 5.88 50.00 15.91 
 ES as explanatory variable 
% Correct 94.12 30.00 79.55 
% Incorrect 5.88 70.00 20.45 
 
Cut-off 0.23 DEF=0 DEF=1 TOTAL 
 MES as explanatory variable 
% Correct 61.76 50.00 59.09 
% Incorrect 38.24 50.00 40.91 
 F-MES as explanatory variable 
% Correct 79.41 80.00 79.55 
% Incorrect 20.59 20.00 20.45 
 ES as explanatory variable 
% Correct 88.24 60.00 81.82 





4. Conclusions  
In this paper we analysed the relationship between measures of systemic risk based on market data 
and the EBA stress test of the European banking system published in October 2014. We focused on 
the measure known as MES, which was proposed by Acharya et al. (2010), and is defined as the 
average returns of a bank when the system (represented by a market index) exceeds a certain VaR. 
The authors provide a theoretical background to justify the use of MES and present results on the 
goodness of this measure as predictor of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program for the US 
banking system. In fact MES, capturing the fragility of a single bank in the presence on a crisis, 
lends itself to be confronted with regulatory stress test exercises.  
 
Our results for the EBA stress test of European banks are partially in contrast with the ones 
presented in Acharya et al. (2010).  As for MES, we cannot find a significant relation between this 
risk measure and the outcomes of the EBA stress test. This conclusion is also in line with the 
critiques recently raised by Kupiec and Guntay (2015), who conclude that “MES measures may be 
incapable of reliably detecting a firm’s systemic risk potential.”. We have also checked the robustness 
of our results with respect to another index as reference index (Eurostoxx50): although the 
relationship with MES becomes slightly significant, the improvement in terms of forecasting is 
negligible. However, when we use a variation of MES that considers the financial sector as 
benchmark (F_MES), our results differ considerably. While in Acharya et al. (2010) both MES and 
F_MES have informative content in relation to the US European stress tests, we find that only the 
latter measure is quite significantly related to the stress test output. This difference in the 
information content between MES and F-MES hints to the idea that the adverse scenario depicted in 
the stress test pictures a crisis that is mainly a financial one. Finally, a comparison with a more 
traditional measure such as ES highlights that F-MES works overall better.  
 
Before drawing conclusions, it should be stressed that results for the US supportive of  MES are 
estimated over a period of crisis, while for the European banking system the latter stress test refers 
to a less turbulent period. Moreover, there is a more general point: the failure of market based 
measure may be related to the very same stress test design (Acharya et al. 2014). Specifically, 
Acharya and Steffen (2014) stress that the European Central Bank’s calculation of shortfalls is 
based on capital ratio depending on risk-weights, which might not reflect the true risk of the banks’ 
assets either in the internal or in the standard approach. Although further research is needed, these 
studies may carry useful regulatory implication for the stress test exercises.   
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Appendix A: List of banks tested by EBA and quoted 
 
The table below summarizes the results of the EBA stress test (as from www.eba.europa.eu) on the 
banks in our sample. The Capital Shortfall is the difference between two components taken from the 
published EBA results: the required 5,5% capital required under the adverse scenario and the 
stressed capital. The variable is set to zero if this difference is negative. CETIER1 is the initial 
capital (Common Equity Tier 1 as from 31/12/2013) taken from the published EBA results. Total 
Loss is the sum of three components taken from the EBA published results: losses on the trading 
book and the banking book in the adverse scenario plus valuation losses due to sovereign shock.  
Quantities are expressed in Mln EUR. 
 
Bank Country Capital Shortfall CETIER1 Total Loss 
Aareal Bank AG Germany 
0 2.187 398 
Allied Irish Banks Ireland 
0 8.923 4.487 
Banca Carige SpA Italy 
1.830 898 2.085 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Italy 
4.250 5.687 10.327 
Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna Italy 
130 3.644 2.912 
Banca Popolare di Milano Italy 
680 2.988 1.964 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Italy 
320 1.740 2.019 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain 
0 36.383 18.695 
Banco BPI Portugal  
0 3.291 1.256 
Banco Commercial Portugues Portugal 
1.140 4.667 3.426 
Banco de Sabadell SA Spain 
0 8.217 4.629 
Banco Popolare Italy 
690 4.234 5.972 
Banco Popular Espanol SA Spain 
0 8.481 5.643 
Banco Santander SA Spain 
0 56.086 40.843 
Bank of Ireland Ireland 
0 6.549 4.327 
Bankinter SA Spain 
0 392 229 
Barclays Bank plc UK 
0 2.781 1.642 
Bnp Paribas France 
0 48.248 23.359 
Commerzbank AG Germany 
0 65.508 32.692 
Credito Emiliano SpA Italy 
0 23.523 10.106 
Danske Bank Denmark 
0 1.756 670 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany 
0 16.463 7.443 
DNB Bank Group ASA Norway 
0 47.312 15.199 
Erste Group AG Austria 
340 8.507 3.168 
Eurobank Ergasias Greece 
0 13.683 3.664 
Group Credite Agricole France 
0 10.173 8.572 
HSBB Holdings plc UK 
4.600 2.979 5.386 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Germany 
0 58.831 27.574 
ING Bank NV Netherlands 
280 237 540 
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA Italy 
0 94.725 43.947 
Jyske Bank Denmark 
0 1.295 440 
KBC Group NV Belgium 
0 30.137 12.449 
Mediobanca Italy 
0 33.333 23.045 
National Bank of Greece Greece 
0 2.264 1.119 
Nordea Bank AB Sweden 
0 11.777 6.119 
OTP Bank Ltd Hungary 
0 33.659 27.188 
Piraeus Bank Greece 
0 4.272 3.572 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc UK 
3.430 4.262 7.857 
Societe Generale France 
0 22.244 9.273 
Svenska HandelsbankenAB Sweden 
30 435 261 
Swedbank AB Sweden 
860 2.834 1.127 
SydbankAB Denmark 
0 3.894 3.639 
Unicredit SpA Italy 
850 2.155 1.303 
Unione di Banche Italiane Italy 




Appendix B: Definition of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
 
Variable Definition Source original data 
 
ES Expected shortfall over the 5% percentile  
 
Datastream (returns) 
MES Marginal expected shortfall calculated with respect to the 
MSCI Europe Index over the 5% percent 
 
Datastream (returns) 
F-MES Marginal expected shortfall calculated with respect to the 
MSCI Europe Banks Index over the 5% percent 
 
Datastream (returns) 
LEVERAGE Total Assets over Book Value of Equity 
 
Datastream (returns) 
DEF Binary variable with value 1 when the capital under stress 
is below the required level 
 
EBA 
LOSS_RATE Total loss under stress over total assets 
 
EBA 
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